Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
on the redistributive effects of germany´s feed-in tariff by Peter Grösche and Carsten Schröder No 2011/07
Introduction
Electricity is an elementary ingredient of our everyday life. Nearly all of our daily activities are somehow related to the consumption of electricity, starting with the alarm clock and the coffeemaker in the morning, and ending with turning on the light bulbs and the TV in the evening. Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence that household spending on electricity is price inelastic, and that the expenditure share for electricity, as for other necessity goods, is inversely related to household income. For example, according to the German "Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure 2008" (StaBuA 2010), a typical German household in the lowest income quintile spends about 3.7 percent of its net income on electricity, as opposed to 1.3 percent in the highest income quintile.
Under such conditions, higher electricity prices raise a relative higher monetary burden on households at the lower end of the income distribution. Accordingly, electricity price-raising environmental policies are likely to have regressive effects. In this regard, the key element of Germany's climate change policy, the feed-in tariff to promote renewable electricity, is particularly interesting. Like in many other industrialized countries, for instance in Australia, Canada/Ontario, several US states or Spain, suppliers of green electricity in Germany receive a fixed payment per kWh for feeding the generated electricity into the public grid. The tariff is technology specific and depends on the year of installation of the generation facility. However, it generally exceeds the electricity spot market price, and provides financial incentives for green electricity generation. The difference between subsidy payment and spot market price is shifted to the electricity consumer, who pays a levy on top of the consumer price. 1 The German approach is quite a success story in terms of green-electricity production: the share of renewables in the electricity mix increased from seven to 17 percent between 2000 and 2010.
However, in the same time the subsidy payments rose from 1.2 billion Euro to about 12.3 billion Euro (UeNB 2010a (UeNB , 2010b , associated with an increase of the levy from 0.6 cent per consumed kilowatthour (ct/kWh) to 2.05 ct/kWh. The design and the scope of the subsidy scheme have evoked a hot debate on its effectiveness. Critics argue that the feed-in tariff facilitates expensive technologies without fostering cost-reducing innovations, while its climate protection effect is nil, because the carbon-dioxide emission in Europe are capped by the European emission trading system, and the subsidized greening of the electricity mix simply relieves emission permits that are now used elsewhere. 2 Besides effectiveness and efficiency, the distributive effects are another central question in gauging the desirability of environmental policies. For the political acceptability of a policy it is decisive who gathers its benefits and who bears its fiscal burden. In the late 1980's, Baumol and Oates (1988, p. 235) already emphasized the relevance of distributional effects for the evaluation of environmental policies:
"Obviously, the distributive side of externalities policy is of interest in and of itself in a world in which inequality and poverty have assumed high priority among social issues. In addition, without adequate consideration of this aspect of the matter, we may not be able to design policies that can obtain the support they require for adoption. Thus, by ignoring the redistributive effects of an environmental policy, we may either unintentionally harm certain groups in society or, alternatively, undermine the program politically."
For such reasons, assessing the redistributive impacts of taxing energy, electricity, carbon or motor fuels has gained popularity in the literature. Fullerton (2008) and Parry et al. (2005) provide a review of previous works, and identify the economic channels through which the personal income distribution may be affected. 3 For several OECD countries, studies such as Pearson and Smith (1991) , Casler and Rafiqui (1993) , Brannlund and Nordstrom (2004) , Wier et al. (2005) , Scott and Eakins (2004) , Callan et al. (2008) , and Grainger and Kolstad (2009) have assessed the redistributive impacts of aforementioned environmental taxes. The general finding is that such taxes have mildly regressive distributional effects which can further be alleviated by revenue recycling, e.g. lump-sum transfer or tax relieves.
While most empirical studies assess the redistributive effects by comparing households' monetary tax burdens at different points (quintiles, deciles, percentiles) of the income distribution, studies using inequality measures to gauge distributive consequences of climate change policy are rare to find. The study of Oladosu and Rose (2007) examines the welfare effects of a carbon tax for a particular east-coast region in the United States. The reported Gini-and Theil indices evince that the tax yields a more equal income distribution, a result quite contrary to the usual findings. Further, Jorgenson et al. (1992) assess the distributional impacts of carbon taxes by means of a social welfare function. They report a modest regressive effect, while the magnitude varies with the level of inequality aversion in the society. Recently, Araar et al. (2011) have conducted a welfare analysis of 2 Other practical issues include corruption, accounting finagling, or ease of implementation (see Nordhaus (2007) ). Concerning the design of economically efficient feed-in-tariff see Lesser and Su (2008) . Menanteau et al. (2003) examine the (static and dynamic) efficiency of different incentive schemes for promoting the development of renewable energy. 3 For previous literature reviews see IPCC (1995: 419-421) , OECD (1995) , and Speck (1999) different domestic emission trading systems using Canadian data. Using the Gini index, they find that overall "the policy effects on inequality is numerically small" (Araar et al., 2011, p. 239) .
The redistributive effects of Germany's feed-in tariff have attained surprisingly scant attention so far, despite equality, equity, and fairness being deeply rooted in the German society. Germany's feed-in tariff is likely to be regressive, i.e. redistributing income shares from the lower to the upper part of the income distribution. Poorer households spend a higher share of their income on electricity than wealthy households, and a levy raised proportionally to electricity consumption emphasizes this differential. Moreover, the collected revenues are used for subsidizing renewable energy installations, investments typically undertaken by wealthier households.
The quantitative strength of the direct monetary redistributive effect of the feed-in tariff on households' budgets hinges both on households' electricity demand and the relationship between household income and green-electricity investments. We assess this redistributive effect by comparing inequality indices computed with and without the direct monetary consequences of the feed-in tariff on households' budgets. As there is no such thing as a "best" inequality index, our analysis relies on four well-known measures: the Gini index, the Theil index, the Atkinson index, and the 90/10 percentile ratio. All statistics indicate a regressive effect, meaning that Germany's feed-in tariff yields a more unequal income distribution. However, this effect is moderate in quantitative terms.
Our results build on several simplifying assumptions. First, we restrict our attention to the distributive effects of the feed-in tariff among households only, though any other investor in green electricity -such as utilities or funds -is entitled to receive the subsidy. Second, concerning the transfers, we exclusively focus on subsidies paid for solar panels (installed by private households). De facto, other forms of production (e.g., wind power) are subsidized as well. Wind power farms are often financed by private funds, and typically wealthier persons invest in such funds. Hence, there is an indirect way how the feed-in tariff affects the income distribution as well, but we lack information about the household's investment portfolio. However, both aforementioned assumptions should lead to an underestimation of the tariffs' regressive effects. Third, behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects are ruled out, with ambiguous effects on inequality estimates. 4 Fourth, we focus on the monetary consequences of the tariff, and thus ignore how other (external) cost and benefits may affect social welfare. 5
The remainder of the paper outlines as follows. Section 2 introduces the inequality indices underlying the empirical analysis. We provide an overview over the used data in Section 3, and the empirical assessment of the redistributive effects in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The paper further includes an Appendix, providing details of the data assembly and estimation methodology.
Measuring inequality
At first instance, the term "inequality" appears to be a somewhat blurry notion since it simply states that the distribution of a particular measure (i.e., income, expenditures, or wealth) deviates from a state of equality. The distribution of a particular measure is unequal if disparities in the measure exist between economic units such as households, individuals, or groups within a society. Inequality analyses typically rely on incomes, since economists consider the income distribution, particularly the distribution of disposable incomes, as a good proxy for the distribution of living standard. Along these lines, this paper selects the households' disposable incomes to derive the distribution of living standard.
Comparing incomes across households requires the researcher to deal with the empirical fact that people living in households which differ in size and material needs. The subsequent paragraph describes the conversion of such a heterogeneous household-level distribution into a quasihomogeneous distribution. Further, the researcher must decide how to measure inequality, meaning the selection of an appropriate inequality index. This sensible issue will be touched in the paragraph after next.
Adjusting household income for differences in needs and household weighting
Inequality analyses are typically based on incomes, as income is interpreted as a close proxy for living standard. However, a complication emerges if the population is heterogeneous and household units differ in size and needs. Then the same disposable income is associated with different levels of material living standard, and an ordering of households by income is not consistent with an ordering by material living standard. For example, it is unlikely that a four-member household and a singleperson household, both endowed with the same disposable income of 2,000 Euro per month, attain the same material living standard. However, it is also unlikely that the four-person household needs four times the income of the one-member household to attain the same standard of material wellbeing, since larger households have the ability to share appliances and household equipment.
To capture such scale effects, household incomes are adjusted for differences in needs by means of equivalence scales, meaning that the household income is divided by the respective equivalence scale. Equivalence scales reflect intra-household sharing potentials and differences in family members' needs, and normalize the household income to the needs of a benchmark household, in our case a single-person household. In our empirical examination, we use the square root equivalence scale (OECD 2011): the number of household members to the power of 0.5. Accordingly, the above mentioned four-person household with a household income of 2,000 Euro attains a livingstandard equivalent to a one-member household endowed with an income of 1,000 Euro, i.e. 2,000/4 0.5 . The result of this operation is a (needs-adjusted) equalized income which can now be assigned to each respective household member. 6 This procedure transforms the heterogeneous distribution of household incomes at the household level in a quasi-homogeneous distribution of individuals, which is underlying our inequality analysis. In the quasi-homogeneous distribution, income units are comparable in terms of material living standards as income is adjusted for differences in needs, and observations are comparable in size as persons are chosen as observation unit.
Inequality indices
The magnitude of income inequality is typically represented by a scalar, an inequality index. 7 By definition, it condenses all the particularities of an income distribution in a single number. Numerous inequality measures have been suggested in the literature, including ad-hoc measures (e.g., Gini index and percentile ratios), entropy-based measures (e.g. Theil index), and measures based on social-welfare functions (e.g., Atkinson and Dalton index). Each approach and measure possesses particular weaknesses and strengths. Accordingly, there is no such thing as a "best" inequality index.
Moreover, it is not ruled out that two indices yield different rankings of income distributions. For these reasons, our inequality analysis builds on a set of four well-known inequality indices: the 90/10 percentile ratio, the Gini coefficient, the Theil index, and the Atkinson index, all being defined subsequently. 6 Theoretical issues of alternative techniques to convert heterogeneous distributions in quasi-homogeneous distributions are discussed in Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004) , while Bönke and Schröder (2010) provide an empirical examination of the role of alternative conversion techniques. 7 An alternative (complementary) option is to depict the extent of inequality by means of graphical device such as the Lorenz curve or the Parade of Dwarfs. See Cowell (2011) for an overview.
90/10 percentile ratio
The 90/10 percentile ratio is a simple ad-hoc inequality measure. Let i y be the income of person , 1, , i i n = … . Then the 90/10 percentile ratio measures the range (in relative terms) between the income of a person in the 90 th ( 90 For instance, a 90/10 percentile ratio of 9010 4 p = indicates that somebody at the 90th percentile has an income which is four times higher than the income of somebody who belongs to the 10th percentile.
Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient, G , is probably the most frequently used inequality index in applied inequality research. Let ( ) F y denote the proportion of the population with income less than or equal to y , and let y denote the mean income of the population. Then ( ) y Φ is the proportion of total income received by persons having an income not more than y , with:
where z is the integration variable (income). The Lorenz curve ( ) , F Φ graphs the population proportion F versus the income proportion Φ . The Gini index is defined as twice the area between the line of perfect equality (each household has the same income) and the Lorenz curve: 
Theil index
The Theil index belongs to the family of generalized entropy indices and is defined as
Entropy-based inequality measures rely on an analogy between inequality analysis and information theory. Information theory assigns probabilities to events and values the information that an event has occurred. The lower the probability for an event, the more weight is assigned to the information that the event has been observed. Theil has suggested a re-interpretation of the entropy concept:
Events are interpreted as economic units (people or households) and probabilities as the income shares of the households from total income. The Theil index thus assigns a higher weight to lowincome units than to high-income units.
Atkinson index
The Atkinson index explicitly relies on a particular type of social welfare function (SWF). The SWF reflects a society's preference towards (in)equality, generally meaning that the valuation a society
gives to a person's income decreases with the increase of the person's economic position. The SWF is The parameter ε captures the degree of inequality aversion in the society. The higher is ε , the more sensitive to inequality is the society. The Atkinson index is defined as ( )
where EDE ε denotes the equally-distributed-equivalent income. EDE ε provides the level of income per head which, if equally shared, would generate the same level of social welfare as the observed distribution and is defined as: 
Properties of inequality indices
A set of five key principles has been suggested in the inequality literature: weak/strong principle of transfers, income scale independence, population principle, and decomposability. 8 We proceed with an introduction of the principles, and then summarize the properties of the aforementioned four indices.
Weak principle of transfer (WPT)
Let an income distribution A be achieved by a simple redistribution of income from a distribution B , holding total income constant and ensuring that the Lorenz curve for A lies wholly inside that of B . Then, inequality measures that comply with WPT always indicate strictly less inequality for situation A than for B .
Strong principle of transfer (SPT)
SPT requires that the inequality reduction due to an income transfer from a rich person to a poor person depends on the difference between the two persons' income. It does not matter which two individuals are involved in the transfer.
Principle of income scale independence (ISI)
An index complies with ISI if the index depends on the distribution of total income but not on the actual level of total income. More precisely, if every person's income changes by the same proportion, then the level of measured inequality should remain unchanged.
Population principle (PP)
An index meets PP if it depends on the distribution of total income but not on the number of persons in the population. Accordingly, if we merge two identical income distributions, inequality is unchanged if the index satisfies PP.
Decomposability (D)
Finally, according to D, the total inequality in an income distribution can be expressed as a function of inequality within its subgroups (e.g., household types) and inequality between the subgroups.
The properties of the used inequality measures are summarized in Table 1 annual electricity consumption and whether a household owns solar panels is reported. Such data are crucial for our purposes, and GRECS is the only household micro database including all the information jointly. 9 From annual electricity consumption we can quantify the levy burden.
Ownership of solar panels indicates whether households generate revenues from the feed-in subsidy scheme. increases in income but its expenditure share declines (i.e. the income elasticity is between zero and one). These numbers confirm that electricity -like food, water and gas -is a necessity good. 
Electricity consumption

Levy payment
The German feed-in tariff is funded by a levy on top of the consumer electricity price. The last two columns of Table 2 give the results of a back-of-the-envelope calculation to assess the levy payment of a typical household in each income class. In 2008, a levy of 1.1 ct per consumed kWh was charged, and the typical household in the second income class consumed on average 2,012 kWh. Accordingly, these households paid a levy of about 22.13 Euro per year. Since the levy is strictly connected to the electricity consumption, the absolute level of levy paid by the households rises with income, while the levy-induced monetary burden relative to income decreases with household disposable income.
The GRECS survey includes electricity billing data, but not all interviewed households provide their consumption data. The figures reported in Table 2 rely on 2,594 households. In the inequality analysis, we have imputed electricity consumption and resulting annual levy payment for all households where the information is missing using the correlation between household size, occupied living space and electricity consumption. More precisely, we run ordinary least square regressions for electricity consumption on dwelling and household size, and use the predicted values to impute electricity consumption in case of missing information. For details see the Appendix.
Solar facilities: distribution of ownership
Households consume electricity but also they may produce green electricity, for instance if they have solar panels installed on their roofs. We expect a positive relationship between the household's disposable income, the size and the quality of the household's accommodation, and the endowment with a solar installation. While less wealthy households typically rent a dwelling, and have little opportunity to install a solar panel, wealthy households are more likely to live in their own property, and have space and money to invest in such panels. ( ) min , r c is the minimum of the number of rows and columns. In our case, the correlation between income category and the possession of solar panels is 0.1. However, the quantitatively small number should not be interpreted as a weak correlation. As can be seen from the definition of Cramér's V , its upper limit is less than 1.0 when numbers of rows and columns are different, which is the case as we have a two item variable for ownership of solar panels (yes, no) but a ten item variable for income. 
Income imputation
Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess the feed-in tariffs redistributive effects from GRECS directly, as household income is not provided as a continuous variable. Instead, income is provided by a categorical variable, indicating whether the household's disposable income belongs to a particular income class. To circumvent the limitations arising from the categorical information, we transform the income data into a continuous variable: An auxiliary data set provides information on household income in continuous form, from which we estimate a household-type specific income distribution for Germany. We impute a household income in the GRECS data set from the fitted income distribution using a bootstrap procedure. The Appendix describes the imputation procedure in detail.
We choose 1, 000 R = bootstrap replications, where each replication generates an imputed income for every household and an according bootstrap income distribution. In the subsequent analysis we precede with these imputed bootstrap distributions.
Empirical assessment of the feed-in tariffs' redistributive effects
The starting point for our distribution analysis is a benchmark scenario, where we compute inequality indices from the disposable income distribution without any adjustment for the feed-in tariffs distributional effects. Departing from the inequality estimates for the benchmark scenario, we assess the tariffs' distributional effects for several alternative scenarios. More precisely, for any alternative scenario, we adjust the income distribution for the levy burden and the provided feed-in payments from solar panels, and re-calculate the inequality indices. Then we gauge the distributional effects of the feed-in tariff scheme by comparing the adjusted income distribution in the scenarios with the benchmark.
Defining the scenarios
Our first scenario involves the distributional effects in year 2010, when a levy of 2.05 ct per consumed kWh electricity was charged. We then precede our investigation with 2011 with a levy of 3.53 ct/kWh. For future periods no "official" point estimates for the levy are published yet, so that we have extrapolated the relative increase of the levy for 2012 to 2015. In this respect, we use forecasts of generation and associated feed-in remunerations for renewable electricity, forecasts of the revenues from selling the provided electricity at the spot market, and estimates of the future electricity end-use consumption, in order to assess a likely future path of the levy charge (Table 4) .
To be more specific, it is expected that about 93.7 TWh of renewable electricity will be supplied in 2011, and the associated remunerations reach about 15.6 billion Euro. Selling this amount of electricity yields revenues of 5.5 billion Euro, so that 10.1 billion Euro must be financed via levies to be paid by the consumers. Dividing the funding gap of 10.1 billion Euro by the expected electricity end-use consumption of 407 TWh, we end up with an estimate for the levy in 2011 of 2.5 ct per kWh consumed electricity. The same calculation for the year 2012 yields a levy of 2.8 ct per kWh, an increase of more than 13%. However, since the actual levy charged in 2011 is 3.53 ct per kWh, an increase of 13% implies a levy of 4.0 ct/kWh. We update the 2012 estimate accordingly, and crosscheck our estimate with the computations of the authority responsible for fixing the levy. While the authority expects the levy being in the interval 3.4 ct per kWh to 4.4 ct per kWh (UeNB 2010c), our estimate of 4.0 ct/kWh is exactly central in this interval.
For the future periods 2013 to 2015 the levy estimate can be computed in a like manner. For 2013, we estimate the levy to reach 4.3 ct/kWh, reaching 4.6 ct/kWh in 2014, and 4.9 ct/kWh in 2015.
Since we lack external information about a reasonable interval for the levy in future periods, we are unable to cross-check our computations. Table 4 summarizes the scenario set-up. Having determined a likely path for the levy levels in future years, the annual levy payments for each and every household must be determined. The easiest way is to assume a price inelastic demand for electricity, and thereby neglecting any responsiveness of consumer behavior to price changes.
Though this assumption might appear strong, it is supported by the low price elasticities reported in previous studies. For example, Narayan et al. (2007) find a short-run price elasticity of -0.1068 for residential demand elasticities in G7 countries. For Swiss households Fillippini (1999) has estimated a price elasticity of -0.3, and according to Boonekamp (2007) , households in the Netherlands exhibit a smaller price responsiveness with an elasticity of -0.13. Thus, electricity demand seems to be highly inelastic, at least in the short run and for reasonable price variations as in our scenarios.
We hence fix households electricity consumption at the 2008 values, and calculate for every household in our data set the respective total annual cost associated with the levy. That means, a household consuming e.g. 2 000 kWh per year paid 22 Euro as levy in 2008, the levy cost will amount to 70.60 Euro in 2011, and will add up to 98 Euro in 2015.
Results
The distributional effects of Germany's feed-in tariff are summarized in Table 5 . The scenarios appear row-wise: In the benchmark scenario, inequality estimates are derived from the distribution of equalized disposable incomes before levy and fee-in tariff related transfers to owners of solar panels.
In the adjacent two rows follow the 2010 scenario with a levy of 2.05 ct/kWh, and the 2011 scenario with a levy of 3.53 ct/kWh. Underneath appear the results of three scenarios for year 2012. These three scenarios reflect forecasts of an upper and a lower bound of the levy according to the responsible grid authority (UeNB 2010c), and also our own projection, which is exactly centered in this interval. The last three rows contain the scenarios for 2013 to 2015, where we expect the levy to rise from 4.3 ct/kWh to 4.9 ct/kWh. For each scenario, seven measures are provided, appearing column-wise, the 90/10 percentile ratio, the Gini and Theil index, and the Atkinson index with inequality aversion parameters 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0. For each measure, two statistics are provided: the estimator of the mean, and the 95 percent bootstrap confidence interval (appearing in brackets underneath). We have also computed percentage deviations from the benchmark scenario for each and every measure (appearing in parentheses). For example, take the 2011 scenario. Here the bootstrap mean of equalized income, The corresponding distributional effects are captured by the associated inequality indices. Except the 90/10 percentile ratio which always exceeds 1.0, all indices are multiplied with a factor of 100. As can be seen from the 90/10 percentile ratios, the feed-in tariff broadens the income divide between the bottom and the top of the distribution: While in the benchmark scenario the equalized disposable income of high-income households (90 th percentile) is 3.259 times the income of low income households (10 th percentile), the factor increases to 3.272 in the 2011 scenario and to 3.285 in the 2015 scenario. There are two basic causes explaining the rise of the 90/10 percentile ratio. First, electricity is a necessity good with an expenditure share which is decreasing in income. Accordingly, relative to income, the levy induced monetary loss is higher at the bottom compared to the top of the distribution. Second, the fraction of households owning solar panels is increasing in income.
Accordingly, revenues accrue especially at the top of the distribution.
The results for the 90/10 percentile ratio indicate that Germany's feed-in tariff scheme is associated with a regressive effect on the distribution of equalized disposable income. This result is reconfirmed by the other inequality indices. The Gini index suggests that the regressive effect is quantitatively small. The bootstrap estimator of the mean is 27.092% in the benchmark scenario, and even in the 2015 scenario, the scenario with the highest levy, it has risen only by 0.518% to a level of 27.232%.
However, when interpreting the result it should be kept in mind that the Gini index puts a lot of weight to the middle part of the income distribution, and thus is insensitive to changes at the very bottom and top. The Theil index, for example, is more sensitive to the redistributive effects of the feed-in tariff scheme: In the 2015 scenario, it is 1% higher as in the benchmark.
The Atkinson index allows an assessment of distributional effects for different levels of inequality aversion, as captured by the parameter ε . In a society with low preferences against income inequality (i.e., 0.5 ε = ), inequality increases by 1.02% from the benchmark to the 2015 scenario. In a society with a higher inequality aversion (e.g.
1.0 ε = ), the change in the Atkinson index amounts to 1.04%, and respectively to 1.10% if
The results from Table 5 indicate that the regressive effect rises with the levy level. Figure 2 gives supporting evidence, where we have plotted our inequality indices against the levy levels (in ct/kWh). The solid lines give the bootstrap estimate of the mean index, while the grey lines indicate the 95 percent confidence interval. For all four indices, we find an almost linear relationship between the levy and the level of measured inequality.
Figure 2 about here
The changes in the equally-distributed-equivalent income, EDE , provide a numerical representation of the additional welfare loss due to increasing income inequality. Remember from Figure 1 that y is the mean equalized income of a particular scenario, and is documented in column 1 in Table 5 . By contrast, EDE captures the (equalized) income that gives rise to the same level of social welfare like the actual income distribution but is equally distributed among the members of the population. If a society has preferences in favor of a more equal income distribution, y EDE > and the differences denotes the social welfare loss (in monetary terms) that arise due to the inequality in the income distribution. In other words: a society is willing to sacrifice y EDE − in per capita income, in order to reduce income inequality. By rearranging equation (6) which can be calculated from the Atkinson index and the mean equalized income, both provided in Table 5 . By comparing the magnitude of this difference over the several scenarios, we are able to gauge whether the regressive effects of the feed-in tariff are of political relevance or too small to be of importance. Table 6 illustrates the welfare loss due income inequality. In the benchmark scenario, the welfare loss amounts to 1,245 Euro up to 4,507 Euro, depending on the level of inequality aversion in the society. The table also reveals the additional welfare losses resulting from the regressive effects of the feed-in tariff scheme. Consider for example the 2011 scenario. The levy of 3.53 ct/kWh and the subsidy payments to the owners of photovoltaic panels increase income inequality compared to the benchmark scenario. To remove this additional incurred inequality, the society is willing to sacrifice about 6 Euro to 23 Euros per capita, depending on the level of inequality aversion. In the 2005 scenario with a levy of 4.9 ct/kWh, the additional loss of welfare due to the increase income inequality is 7 Euros to 29 Euros. These additional welfare losses are very moderate. Yet, they come in addition to the reductions in mean disposable income. 
Concluding remarks
There are dissenting views on the design and success of Germany's feed-in tariff scheme to promote renewable electricity generation. Advocators emphasize that it is appealing having led to a substantial rise of the share of renewable fuels in the electricity mix. By contrast, critics argue that the system is costly and inefficient. From a neutral position we can state that the share of renewable fuels in the electricity mix increased under the regime of the feed-in tariff from seven percent in 2000 to about 17 percent in 2011, but also imposed substantial cost to the electricity consumer due to subsidizing renewables.
This paper analyzes the question whether the feed-in tariff scheme increases income inequality in the society and thereby conflicts with the general social goal to reduce disparities in peoples' disposable incomes. We use four well-established inequality indices to assess the redistributive impacts of the feed-in tariff on the income distribution. All our calculations indicate that Germany's feed-in tariff is regressive, but that the redistributive effect is quantitatively small. From this general point of view, there is little doubt concerning the feed-in-tariff's political acceptability and performance. At the same time, we would like to point out that the tariff reduces the disposable incomes of households positioned at the very bottom of the distribution, and this may be viewed as particularly problematic: As electricity has characteristics of a necessity good, it cannot easily be substituted, and related expenditures make up a substantial fraction of low income households' budgets.
One last but very important point has to be stressed. The electricity consumers in Germany fund a subsidy system that redistributes about 13 billion Euro in 2011, with rising tendency. Our analysis shows that the per-capita contribution to this funding is minor from a distributional point of view.
This paper does not contribute to the discussion whether the feed-in tariff attains its goals in a costefficient way. But we do believe that it must be a foregone conclusion to make the most of the electricity consumer's money in terms of renewable electricity.
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On the redistributive effects of Germany's feed-in tariff
Imputation of electricity consumption
The GRECS data set consists of 6 714 households, from which we observe electricity consumption for 2 594 households, and respectively lack information for 4 120 households. To impute missing consumption data, we estimate the following model with ordinary least squares:
( ) The results are depicted in Table A1 . Given the parsimonious specification, the coefficient of determination indicates a quite satisfactory explanatory power for cross sectional consumption data.
The regression coefficients indicate that electricity consumption and household size are positively correlated, and that each additional square meter living space raises the electricity consumption by 7
kWh a year. Using the predicted values, we impute lacking electricity consumption figures. 
Income imputation
As outlined in the main body of the paper, GRECS provides income only in the form of a categorical variable. In order to impute discrete disposable incomes in GRECS, we follow a procedure involving two stages. First, we estimate household-type specific income distributions for Germany using an auxiliary data set. Second, we transcribe the fitted distribution to the GRECS data set, and use the inverse distribution to impute an income to every household observation in the GRECS data set.
Stage 1: Estimating an income distribution
In order to estimate an income distribution for Germany, we draw auxiliary data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a panel dataset of the population in Germany. The GSOEP contains information of more than 10 000 households, and more than 20 000 adult persons. Apart from household disposable incomes, the GSOEP provides information on household composition (number of adults and children), occupation, employment, earnings, etc.
We start with estimating a four parameter Generalized Beta distribution of the Second Kind (GBD2K).
According to McDonald (1984, p.660) , this distribution "provides the best relative fit" to empirical income data (for an assessment based on unit record data see Brachmann et al., 1996) .
The GBD2K probability density function is defined as (McDonald, 1984) 
is the beta function. For particular parameter values, the GBD2K includes some well-known distributions, one of which the log normal distribution (McDonalds, 1984, and Kleiber and Kotz, 2003) . Particularly, if 1 q = (and also 1 a = respectively 1 p = ), we have the special case of a Dagum distribution (Inverse Lomax respectively Fisk (log logistic) distribution); . if 1 a = (and also 1 q = respectively 1 p = ), we have the Beta distribution of the Second Kind (Inverse Lomax respectively Lomax distribution); and if 1 p = (and also 1 q = respectively 1 a = ), we have the Singh-Maddala distribution (Fisk respectively Lomax distribution).
Using the STATA ado-package "gb2fit" (Jenkins 2004) , we estimate the parameters of GBD2K. By imposing constraints on the distribution parameters, we further test whether the underlying income distribution belongs to a particular special case of GBD2K. It turns out that we cannot reject the hypotheses 1 p = , meaning that the German income distribution is of type Singh-Maddala 
To allow for the possibility that income distributions are different across household types, we proceed with the SM distribution and allow its distribution parameters ( , , ) a b q to be depending on household size (see Biewen and Jenkins, 2005) . The parameter estimates obtained from GSOEP 2009 including standard errors and significance levels are provided in Table A2 .
The single person household serves as the reference case and the other entries measure the deviation for the particular parameter estimate from the reference case. For instance, the estimate for the parameter q in case of three member households is 3 1.191 0.442 0.749
The corresponding estimates of cumulative density functions of disposable income are depicted in Figure   A1 . In order to assess the fit of the estimated household-type specific income distributions, we compare actual GSOEP income observations with the predicted values obtained from the fitted SM distributions. For each household separately, Figure A2 plots the predicted disposable incomes (derived from the inverse SM distribution) against the observed disposable income of every household. The closer the observations are to the 45° line, the smaller is the difference between the predicted and the observed distribution. Visual inspection of Figure A2 reveals a satisfactory fit for all household types, the summary statistics in Table A3 gives additional confirmative evidence. In the columns entitled "GSOEP, Observed", the For example, take the entry "2 300" in column "2, GSOEP, observed," row "P50". It indicates that median disposable income of two-person households is 2,300 Euro per month. The number "2 334" to the right of (column "2, Estimate") is the corresponding estimate taking the parameter vector ( ) 2 2 2, , a b q . For all household types, observed percentiles are always pretty close to their corresponding estimates. The same holds for mean disposable income and the Gini coefficient.
Figure A1 about here
As a final step, we must ensure that the relative frequency of households, belonging to a particular income class, is compatible between the estimated income distribution and the GRECS data set.
Take, for example, the case of single-person households. From equation (2) belong to the second income class, and so on. Whenever we discover a deviation from these relative frequencies in our GRECS data set, we re-weight the observations as to comply with the estimate of the cumulative density function. Information on the imputed income distributions is contained in the column "GRECS, imputed" in Table A3 . In general results deviate only marginally from the GSOEP estimates. Some minor differences can result when sample size in a particular cell (defined by income class and household size) is low. The GRECS data provide information on disposable income by means of ten income classes. In order to transform this discrete information into a continuous variable, we make use of the fitted income distributions, described in the subsection above.
The position of a particular household within its respective income class is, however, unknown, while the imputation of an income using the estimated income distributions requires an ordering of the households within each income class. We circumvent this conflict by applying the following five-step bootstrap procedure.
(1) We assign a random number i r to every household i , where i is of household size (2) In the second step, all households of a particular size and within a particular income class are sorted by i r in ascending order.
(3)
In a third step, we assign a probability weight to each household i of type s in c , calculated as ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , , 0 0 F s = . Accordingly, we equally divide the probability mass pertaining to a certain income class among the households belonging to that class, and every household in this class receives the same probability weight.
(4) Now, the fourth step involves computing cumulative probability weight i Π (i.e., the percentile position) for every household with respect to its income class and its rank i r : to impute income ˆi y for household i at percentile i Π .
To ensure that the assignment of ranks within an income class does not drive results in the subsequent distribution analysis, we execute this bootstrap procedure 1 000 times, yielding a bootstrap sample of 1 000 distributions of disposable incomes. 
